



Key features of the traditional agricultural credit extension

- 1. external (to the rural sector) financing by government and external donors
- 2. production credit (supervised credit, targeted credit)
- 3. no savings mobilization
- 4. subsidized credit (low interest rate)
- **5. collateral to overcome information asymmetry** (see also next transparency)

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



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Why was the traditional agricultural credit approach not successful?

- > uncertainties of Govt. Funding
- > no own capital mobilization (savings)
 - ⇒ lack of independence
- > distortions caused by subsidized credit
- ⇒ growth effect questionable, probably negative
- - ⇒ impact on institutional sustainability negative
- > linkage between Govt. Funding and repayment performance
- > Govt. influence undermines institutional independence

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- 3. Credit-terms
- 4. Costs of credit extension

Financial funds costs (see also next transparency) **Transaction costs**

5. Information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard

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Cost of Credit Extension

For the credit institution

- 1. Costs of finance: costs of procurement of funds
- 2. Transaction costs
 - staff remuneration
 - material costs
 - reserves
- = Total costs for the credit institution
 - profit margin
- Market rate of interest (including fees etc.)


For the borrower


3. Costs of finance: interest payment to the credit institution (im)

Transaction costs

- transport
- opportunity costs of time
- costs of advice and procurement of information
- securities, guarantees
- certificates (f.e., certificate of residence, employment, good standing etc.)
- Total costs for the borrower

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
Information is asymmetric

when one party to an economic relationship or transaction has less information about it than the other party or parties. While asymmetric information characterizes many markets, one could claim that it particularly pervades financial markets

Three problems in particular have been associated with asymmetric information:

- adverse selection
- · moral hazard and
- herding behaviour (remember East Asia crisis)

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Nominal and real rate of interest

The *real rate of interest* is equal to the *nominal rate of interest* minus the effects of inflation.

The *real rate of interest* (r) is derived from the *nominal rate of interest* (i) and the *inflation rate* (p) according to the following formula:

$$r = \left(\frac{1+i}{1+p} - 1\right) \times 100$$

Example: i=18%, p=12%

$$r = \left(\frac{1,18}{1,12} - 1\right) \times 100$$

$$=(1,0536-1)\times100$$

$$=5,36\%$$

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Credit need and terms for investment financing

Terms investment financing

(Example: investment costs of 100)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
investment	100							
current expenditures		30	40	60	70	70	70	70
gross revenues		10	30	60	80	120	160	200
net revenues	-100	-20	-10	0	10	50	90	130
credit inflow	80							
equity contribution	20							
annuity	0	0	0	0	0	42	42	42
cash flow	0	-20	-10	0	10	8	48	88

Total debt outstanding after grace period 108,84

Annuityfactor A: 0,388

4 years grace; 7 years total maturity


Interest being capitalized during grace, i: 8%

Credit conditions

I = 100; credit volume 80% of I; own contribution 20% of I

3 years grace period, Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a

maximum maturity 6 years, i = 8%



Case 2: The individual contributions of the RoSCA members vary from group meeting to group meeting (Four members: A, B, C and D)


RoSCA members and their contribution	A	В	С	D	Σ of individual contributions
	X 50 100	50 X 80	100 80 X	200 120 60	350 + X 250 + X 240 + X
	200	120	60	Х	380 + X
Σ of contributions received by individual member	350 + X	250 + X	240 + X	380 + X	
Σ of net loan received by individual member	350	200	60	0	


Suppose: RoSCA beneficiary is determined by lottery. But for simplification suppose that member A receives the RoSCA pot first, then B, C, and finally member D. Thus, member A receives a net-loan of 350 and the last member to benefit is a net-saver which means his net-loan is zero.

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
Informal Savir	Rural Finance: Prof. Heidhues ngs- and Credit groups
pro	contra
 + low cost + high repayment rates + need orientation + unbureaucratic, quick loan decision process + no collateral + mutual insurance system 	 - generally relatively short-term oriented - cumulative credit need - no interregional inter-mediation (fragmentation) - operating outside governmental/central bank policy
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Advanta	iges and disadvanta	ges of informal & fo	rmal finance
Informal fi	nancial sector	Formal fina	ancial sector
Advantages	Disadvantages	Disadvantages	Advantages
social cohesion (confidence) closeness to clients/members little bureaucracy flexibility low transaction costs	 short-term financial products savings eventually insecure low, locally limited capital mobilization, fragmentation little professionallity & infrastructure 	little cost efficiency little closeness to clients political influence possible bureaucratic procedures fragmentation	 monetarisation, i.e. systemic savings mobilization if formal financial sector accessible: economic development through income creating investments (transaction volume and time horizon)
Advantages	Disadv	antages	Advantages
	Formal financial se	ctor Informa	l financial sector
Advantage	economic	organiza	ational / institutional
Disadvantage	organizational / instituti	onal	economic







Rural Finance: Prof. Heidhues The new approach to rural finance (contin.) 3. Ensure outreach to the whole spectrum of the rural population it supports rural growth it improves an equitable income distribution it enhances portfolio diversification of the rural finance institution and reduces risk 4. Observe the systems linkages





credit with group-liability 3. Credit allocation at the local level by clients 4. Integration of women 5. Building of guarantee and emergency funds 6. Unconditional enforcement of repayment (exclude group from access to further loans, seizing of group savings) 7. Cover costs 8. Credit/savings/plus-approach, i.e. offering of extension in		Rural Finance: Prof. Heidhues
(innovative approaches) 1. Mobilization of savings; savings as collateral 2. Group building and group-credit with group-liability 3. Credit allocation at the local level by clients 4. Integration of women 5. Building of guarantee and emergency funds 6. Unconditional enforcement of repayment (exclude group from access to further loans, seizing of group savings) 7. Cover costs 8. Credit/savings/plus-approach, i.e. offering of extension in	Building of ru	ral financial markets
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addition to savings and credits (areas of extension: livestock,	savings as collateral 2. Group building and group-credit with group-liability 3. Credit allocation at the local level by clients 4. Integration of women 5. Building of guarantee and emergency funds 6. Unconditional enforcement of repayment (exclude group from access to further loans, seizing of group savings) 7. Cover costs 8. Credit/savings/plus-approach, i.e. offering of extension in addition to savings and credits	cold money, i.e. (exclusively) funds by the government or international donors 2. Subsidizing of interest-rate (but support of institution building often indispensable) 3. Credit as appendage to a production project 4. Politically motivated debt relieve 5. Use of extension workers as



















Grameen Bank: Profitability

Ever since Grameen Bank came into being, it has made profit every year except in 1983, 1991 and 1992.

Low interest

Three types of loans:

- a) income generating loans (20% interest)
- b) housing loans (8% interest)
- c) higher education loans for the children of Grameen families (5%)

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Scholarships

- Given on children of Grameen families
- Priority of girl children to encourage for better grades
- Ca. 3700 scholarships per year

Education Loans

Students who succeed in reaching the tertiary level of education are given higher education loans.

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Women prevail

According to the website of Grameen Bank at March 2003 the total number of borrowers is 2.6 million, 95% of them are women.

90% Self-Reliant

- Total outstanding loan is Tk 13,52 billion
- 90% from the loan financed from banks own fund and the savings from depositors
- Over 82% from depositors are ist own borrowers

Recovery Rate

The Bank reported in March 2003 recovery rate from 98,74%.

(Source: www.grameen-info.org/bank/GBGlance.html)

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Reasons for the high repayment rate

- Target group oriented credit disbursement; only group-membership allows access to credit; strict compliance with group discipline and group solidarity.
- 2. Excellent management and decentralized structure of decision.
- 3. Continuous training of the bank employees and strong motivation.
- 4. Adjustment of the repayment to the repayment capacity and the income-cycle of the target groups.

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	Members	Non-Members
Growth of assets	2,5%	1%
Livestock per 100 borrowers (No. of animals)	102	61
Income	43% higher than in	ncome of non-members
Outreach to "ultra poor"	48%	75%
Costs: 21,7% of the disbursed + 5,0% interest of		